Islamabad and controversies are close cousins. The latest salvo fired by ex President Mushraff about the misuse of American aid in building arms theatre against India should be an eye-opener to the Pakistani aid givers. Who knows, Pakistan leaders may be hosting and patronizing top Al Qaeda leaders in their palaces to milk more aid from the western world in the name of fight against terrorism.
The Times of India writes (19 September 2009)
It seems to be the season for revelations. First came A Q Khan's admission in a televised interview that he and other administration officials had
acted as enablers for Iran's incipient nuclear programme, guiding it to the network of suppliers that Khan himself had used. He also hinted that Pakistan had supplied centrifuges to North Korea. Implicit in both these admissions was the assertion that he was no loose cannon but had acted with Islamabad's full knowledge and cooperation. Then came his bete noire Pervez Musharraf's turn. The former Pakistani president revealed that much of the financial aid and military equipment supplied by the US in the wake of 9/11 had been diverted to Pakistan's eastern border rather than used in the fight against the Taliban. Neither admission is particularly surprising, but they highlight yet again the problems of accountability and oversight when it comes to aid to Pakistan.
To some extent, the laissez-faire attitude of the Bush administration has been replaced by more stringent accountability norms in Washington. The Kerry-Lugar Bill that authorises $7.5 billion in non-military aid to Pakistan over the next five years also imposes checks and conditions on military aid, including a biannual report on how the aid is being utilised. But good intentions do not always translate into concrete action. There are bound to be situations where it will be convenient to elide certain conditions for the sake of eliciting cooperation from Islamabad. The challenge now is for the Obama administration to resist the lure of expediency.
This is in its own best interests. If New Delhi is to soften its post-26/11 stance, allowing Washington the greater manoeuvring space it wants with Islamabad, it must have certain assurances. Among these is certifiable evidence that US aid is not being misused to bolster Pakistan's anti-India capabilities, as has been the case with the US-supplied Harpoon missiles and P-3C Orion aircraft. Even more pressing for Washington is the need to make certain that the aid is not being diverted to boost Pakistan's nuclear assets, and that they are secure. This is particularly so in light of Af-Pak special envoy Richard Holbrooke's statement that al-Qaeda is seeking nuclear secrets from Pakistan. The issue resonates far beyond the confines of South Asia. Some of the thorniest problems facing the Obama administration today Iran and North Korea have direct links to Pakistan.
Islamabad must realise that knee-jerk nationalism and protests about infringement of its sovereignty will serve little purpose here. It has no one to blame but its previous administration. Khan's scenario of government complicity in his dealings is far more plausible than Musharraf's. And more importantly, Islamabad needs the aid to combat the militancy that has infected large swathes of the Pakistani state for its own sake.
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