Lost Freedom of Tibet

The Tibetan government in exile is in dilemma. To oppose and succeed the mighty Chinese is impossible. It will also be in contrary to the Dalai Lama's non violent principles if they take up arms. After unsuccessfully opposing the olympics in Beijing despite a strong no from the Dalai Lama, the Tibetans are crossroads now. It is not possible now even the autonomy demanded by Tibetans as the least concession from China.

Elliot Sperling of the Indiana university writes in The Times of India (20 July 2009)

As if any further evidence were needed of the ways in which China has been running rings around the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile, recent

events have made the situation abundantly clear. Last November the Tibetans presented a memorandum to China, meant to demonstrate that the Dalai Lama's position on Tibetan autonomy was wholly compatible with China's existing laws on regional nationality autonomy. The memorandum was vehemently rejected and the dialogue process between the two sides screeched to a halt.

On June 22, there were reports that exiled Tibetan officials were meeting to draft a statement clarifying their stand and, it was hoped, would open a way out of the impasse. The new statement is intended to demonstrate that the Tibetans want to reach an accord with China on the basis of Chinese autonomy laws. Unfortunately, the ignorance with which the authorities in exile deal with China is now on display in embarrassing detail.

The Dalai Lama's chief negotiators, Kelsang Gyaltsen and Lodi Gyari, have met with other officials to hammer out a position that they fantasise will interest China, and Lobsang Sangay, a Harvard-trained expert, has been reinforcing the exiled government's views with his own analysis of the law. But the fact is that all of these people are functionally illiterate in the hundreds of articles and books all in Chinese that constitute the body of interpretive literature on regional nationality autonomy in China. That never seems to have perturbed the Dalai Lama's people as they wander quite blindly around major issues of Chinese policy.

Since the spring of 2008, China has responded to criticism of its historical claims to Tibet by scrapping its common line, that 13th-century Mongol conquerors made Tibet part of China, with the more forceful, take-no-prisoners position that Tibet has been a part of China "since human activity began". Much as this exemplifies the attitude that history is not an objective measure against which to weigh Chinese claims, so too a new debate has opened in China that demonstrates that the laws on autonomy are not to be considered fixed standards against which the government can be challenged. To the contrary, they are tools of the government and party, dispensable when they are not serving the desired political ends.

In April, seemingly unbeknownst to the Dalai Lama's authorities, Ma Rong, a scholar who often writes on minority demographic and population issues, proposed a drastic measure, akin to what was done in the area of history: scrap the regime of regional nationality autonomy laws. The real problem, according to Ma Rong, is that China's autonomy laws derive from a Stalinist heritage (which, in the Soviet Union, included rights to secession and independence), saddling China with a system that alienates minorities from the notion that they are part of the larger Chinese nationality. Now, with uncanny timing, the recent unrest in Xinjiang has underscored his contention.

As Ma Rong puts it, the nationality laws encourage minorities to exclude others from their regions, privilege their own language, assert economic rights of their own and maintain and strengthen the historical consciousness, religions and practices that differentiate them from others, all in accord with Stalin's definition of "nationality". For Ma Rong, this is the crux of the problem: the current system leaves minorities with little or no sense that they are Chinese. Only three other countries, he notes, ever implemented a similar system with specific geographical regions for minority nationalities: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It goes without saying that the historical track record is not good.

In contrast, India and the United States provide useful counter-examples. Jawaharlal Nehru in particular is cited for imbuing the members of various groups with the sense of being part of "the Indian nation", while at the same time dulling the areas of ethno-national conflict between them. In the US, the election of Barack Obama is presented precisely because his platform was directed at the benefit of all Americans, with no taint of racial interest. Neither country has regional minority nationality autonomous structures.

The debate that Ma Rong opened up in April is of critical importance to China's Tibet policy. But no one in Dharamsala seems to have noticed. Rather than devote resources to acquiring the databases that would allow them to access the wide range of Chinese materials available online, the Dalai Lama decided in May to send $1,00,000 to Florida International University to support its religious studies programme. Though American dharma students are hardly an endangered species, such are Dharamsala's priorities.

Sonam Dagpo, of the Dalai Lama's Department of Information and International Relations, told a news agency towards the end of June that the Tibetans "want to settle the issue mutually and within the framework of the Chinese constitution, law and national regional autonomy". Best of luck with that one, guys.

Elusive Freedom for Tibetans

Tibetan freedom has been completely sidelined even by its own leaders and people. At the minimum they expect autonomy from the occupied Chinese. Despite fifty years of Tibetan struggle there is no possibility of self-rule by the world’s largest refugee community. The Dalai Lama’s global stature and world’s support for the Tibetan cause is not helping them to get any positive response from the Chinese establishment.

Stoban writes in The Times of India, 13.3.2009,

China recently appeared keen on averting a replay of last year's Tibetan unrest that nearly wrecked the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Ahead of the 50th

anniversary of the Tibetan uprising on March 10 this year, it poured extra troops into Tibet to quell any disturbance. Since mid-January, security preparations sanitised the region of pro-Dalai Lama activists and kept out foreigners for fear of violent incidents attracting global spotlight. Internet and mobile text-messaging services have been blocked between March 10 and May 1 for "network improvement". Monasteries have faced shutdowns and monks, subjected to 'patriotic education', have been monitored. On the eve of the anniversary, President Hu Jintao promised to build a "Great Wall" against Tibetan separatism while foreign minister Yang Jiechi warned other countries not to allow their territories to be used by the Dalai Lama for anti-China activities. Yet reports of monks defying orders have filtered out, especially from the Qinghai and Sichuan provinces. But the anniversary went off peacefully in Lhasa amid China's heightened measures. Tibetans in exile staged symbolic protests and called on the "Indian people to free Tibet". The Dalai Lama made unusually strong comments about his anguish at failing to realise a half-century-old struggle for Tibet's independence. He accused Beijing of turning Tibet into "hell on Earth" through periods of martial law and hard-line policies. But he also reiterated the demand for "meaningful autonomy" within the framework of the Chinese constitution. Beijing too did not react to the event with a show of force. Refuting his criticism as "lies", China extolled its own achievements in freeing Tibetans from supposed slavery. It declared March 28, marking the fall of the Dalai Lama regime in 1959, 'Serfs' Liberation Day'. Both sides perhaps saw reason for avoiding mutually counterproductive confrontation. The Tibetan cause has received the world's attention but China has successfully resisted scrutiny by maintaining a seemingly non-negotiable Tibet policy. If anything, explosive anger on the part of Tibetans has merely risked triggering aggrieved nationalism in China. Last year, Beijing was able to whip up public emotions at a time the Dalai Lama finding growing support among the Chinese intelligentsia linked his struggle with democracy's advent in China and his 'unshaken faith' in the Chinese people. But 2008's events damaged China equally. A huge country with the world's largest population and en route to becoming an economic superpower was made to look paranoid and helpless when protesters the world over threatened to mar its Olympics showcase. China's achievements appeared to lack credibility in the international community's eyes. The Chinese perhaps now recognise the soft power the Dalai Lama represents, which can impact negatively on China's image. Beijing in the past followed a dual approach to the Dalai Lama, engaging him through talks but also accusing him of plotting bloody riots. Intermittent dialogue lost steam after the Olympics, with China rejecting a constitutional provision for the Dalai Lama's sway over Tibet via what it called "disguised independence". While Tibetan interlocutors faced condescension and admonishments about riots in Tibet, the talks helped Beijing sidetrack international scrutiny. The Dalai Lama came under intense pressure from younger Tibetans to abandon his mild creed in favour of a more proactive stance. When Beijing warned him to rein in his young followers, they told him to break off talks. Squeezed from both sides, he threatened to retire from political life. But in a special conclave in Dharamsala last November, the majority reaffirmed their allegiance to his non-violent approach. His retirement was ruled out but so were talks until Beijing showed seriousness. There is no visible sign of change in Beijing's waiting-game strategy: waiting for the Dalai Lama to pass away so it can install a pliable replacement. The focus is shifting to the contested issue of succession. For the Dalai Lama, the choice, though involving a mystical process, is becoming clear. He had stoked a debate in 2007 over breaking his born-again rule and opting for a democratically elected successor through a referendum before his death. It is not clear if his recent statements are linked to a divine call or political expediency aimed at thwarting China's control.
The 73-year-old leader's poor health last year compelled his followers to seriously think about a leadership change. It would be difficult to enforce an arrangement not involving the notion of reincarnation. But several campaigns favour passing the mantle to the controversial 17th Karmapa who has Beijing's blessings apart from the Dalai Lama's recognition. Succession is a complex issue under the Tibetan hierarchical system. It could mean the collapse of the Gelukpa's supremacy which, in turn, would fuel dissensions along sectarian lines, resulting in a final victory for China. Tibet could figure prominently on the Obama administration's radar. The US may call for a multilateral approach to ending the imbroglio. For India, Tibet will always cause some anxiety. Last year, New Delhi was both criticised for bending over backwards to please China as well as patted for its realpolitik. With economic issues driving India's China policy, Tibet is unlikely to assume much significance though it is linked to critical security issues. It is not inconceivable that Beijing may at some stage pressure New Delhi to dismantle Dharamsala. India
needs a more sophisticated policy that goes beyond simply curbing the Dalai Lama's activities.China in its own interest should provide autonomy to the Tibetan region and allow all the refugees to return to their motherland. This gesture of China will enhance its image in the world level and automatically push it to the global superpower status. Will this maverick decision click in the minds of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabo ruling combo?